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T

Introduction

he last volume of this publication featured an article,
The Clash of Human Rights and BIT Investor Claims:
Chevron’s Abusive Litigation in Ecuador’s Amazon,
which described how one large transnational corporation stalled
attempts to hold it liable for massive environmental and health
damages by resorting to international arbitration pursuant to the
U.S.-Ecuador bilateral investment treaty (BIT).1 This escape —
even if only temporary — from final resolution of seventeen
years of litigation illustrates a critical accountability gap resulting from a triangular relationship between the host state, the
transnational corporation/foreign investor, and the individual
or community of victims. In a world of as-yet un-harmonized
bodies of international law, there is no single domestic or
supranational forum in which all three actors may easily appear.
Accordingly, this article argues that, with appropriate modifications, the regional human rights systems could serve as a forum
in which host states and foreign investors could be held jointly
accountable to victims who otherwise pay the greatest price of
continued impunity.

For affected communities, the connection between corporate and state
responsibility is clear: signs at a protest following the 2010 BP oil spill.

subject to exploitation by either or both states and corporations,
often through some degree of coordinated action, mutual support, or acquiescence.

The relationships at issue in this article lie at the intersection of international human rights and international investment
law, two separate bodies of law that impose some limits on state
sovereignty. States have negotiated international human rights
law to govern their obligations to individuals and communities.
In the realm of international investment law, states also frequently intervene to negotiate a special set of protections for
foreign investments and investors against host states through
instruments like BITs. Individuals, communities, and corporations, meanwhile, are meant to handle their claims against one
another before domestic courts, in which the state is generally
protected by sovereign immunity. This entire system is based
on a fundamentally false underlying premise that powerful economic non-state actors are on the same level as individuals and
communities, and that all require the protections of international
law against abuses by more powerful states. However, the largest
corporations in a hyper-globalized economy are more economically powerful than the governments of less developed states.2
As a consequence, individuals and communities are at times

The good news is that debate in the field of business and
human rights, led by the pioneering work of UN Special
Representative John Ruggie,3 is very much alive. Moreover,
lawyers and scholars in both international human rights and
international investment law are looking beyond legal compartments and discussing how the two fields ought to interact.
The investment law side has surveyed case law coming out of
the regional human rights systems, seeing how they balance
property rights, economic interests, and other human rights factors, and essentially concluded that the Inter-American system,
at least, “is not the forum to protect business activity against
arbitrary acts of the state.”4 The human rights side has argued
that a state’s human rights obligations should be taken into
account when international arbitration tribunals rule on that
state’s obligations under a BIT and has lamented the general
lack of transparency and opportunities for public participation
in international arbitration.5 But, there is not as of yet a forum
in which these two bodies of law are put on the same level or
the three parties — host states, foreign investors, and individual
or community victims — can simultaneously resolve all their
claims against one another. Moreover, rather than functioning in
tandem to resolve all related claims, the splitting of jurisdictions
and parties often results in continued impunity as in the case in
the seventeen-year litigation history of Lago Agrio.

* Megan S. Chapman is a J.D. candidate (expected 2011) at American
University Washington College of Law and a former co-Editor-inChief of the Human Rights Brief. The author wishes to thank Daniel
Bradlow, Juan Mendez, Ken Anderson, Sara Waldron, Andrew Maki,
and Evan Wilson for invaluable comments and suggestions through the
various drafts of this article.
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ratified New York Convention.8 Yet, although human rights
advocates recently won the right to intervene in a single international arbitration between foreign investors and South Africa
as a host state, this intervention was only for a limited purpose.9
Such forums have no jurisdiction over victims’ human rights or
torts claims against either states or foreign investors and, moreover, specialize only in international investment law.

It is relatively easy to argue for closing this accountability
gap in which both states and foreign investors often escape full
responsibility and victims continue to be denied justice. The
problem comes in identifying a possible or appropriate forum
in which this could occur. Domestic courts in the investor’s
host state are problematic because (1) depending on the level of
judicial independence, these courts may not be willing or politically able to hold powerful foreign investors or state entities
to account; (2) if they are willing to hold investors to account,
they still may lack jurisdiction over the state entities that ought
to share in a portion of damages; and (3) even if willing, they
may be unable to provide sufficient due process guarantees and
impartiality to satisfy the high and flexible standards required
by BITs, allowing investors recourse to international arbitration
against the host state. Domestic courts in the investor’s home
state or another state that offers more judicial independence and
a more impartial forum are often limited because (1) they may
not have jurisdiction over
the claims of foreign plaintiffs alleging extraterritorial
violations; (2) even if the
court does have jurisdiction,
it may be able to avoid hearing such a claim through a
doctrine such as forum non
conveniens; and (3) unless
the foreign (host) state
waives sovereign immunity,
only the investor will be held
to account although the state
or state entities may bear a
portion of the responsibility.

What is worse for victims, states facing possible litigation
before both international forums — regional human rights
organs and international arbitration forums — may encounter
perverse incentives. Because of the disparity between judgments
awarded by international arbitration tribunals and human rights
bodies,10 states would seem to have every incentive to avoid giving the foreign investor cause to go to international arbitration
and relatively little reason to fear a condemnatory decision by a
regional human rights body. If the specter of international arbitration has a further chilling effect on a host state’s ability to regulate and domestic courts’
willingness to hold foreign
investors accountable, victims will continue to disproportionately bear the costs of
epic multi-forum litigation
and delayed justice.

[I]n recognition of
the accountability gap
and fundamental power
imbalances, a supranational
forum is needed to
simultaneously hold
foreign investors and states
accountable for their relative
share of harm to victims.

This article argues that, in
recognition of the accountability gap and fundamental
power imbalances, a supranational forum is needed
to simultaneously hold foreign investors and states
accountable for their relative
share of harm to victims.
An international human
rights mechanism provides
the most appropriate forum.
Among such mechanisms,
the regional human rights
systems are best prepared
based on their experience
adjudicating
individual
claims that involve assessing state responsibility for failure to protect against violations
by non-state actors11 and even informally mediating between
victims, foreign investors, and states.12 Regional human rights
mechanisms could be adapted to offer a solution to the present accountability gap if they were provided with (1) narrowly
delimited jurisdiction over foreign investors who benefit from
BIT protections when states prove unable and unwilling to
offer a domestic forum for resolution of victims’ torts or human
rights claims; (2) jurisdiction to join these foreign investors as
co-respondents with states already defending claims brought by
victims; and (3) the ability to apportion monetary damages or
other remedies between the state and foreign investors.

International forums,
meanwhile, are essentially
specialized forums applying
specialized bodies of law
that apply either between
states or in a unidirectional
claim from a class of private actors — individuals,
communities,
non-state
entities — against the state.
Unsurprisingly, these international forums tend to reflect and replicate economic and other
power imbalances. Among the international forums, regional
human rights systems have developed significantly in recent
decades and are often the most effective mechanism for holding
states accountable to individuals and communities.6 Yet, (1) their
jurisdiction depends on state consent; (2) they lack very effective enforcement mechanisms; and (3) in order to maintain state
consent to jurisdiction and cooperation with final decisions, they
generally award non-monetary or minimal monetary remedies to
victims. On the investment law side are international arbitration
forums, through which foreign investors have direct recourse
against host states as a result of BITs negotiated on their behalf
by the investor’s home state. Unlike regional human rights bodies, international arbitration tribunals can and do award large
monetary damages to foreign investors7 and these awards are
generally enforceable in domestic jurisdictions under the widely

The article will proceed with a brief analysis of the Lago
Agrio litigation to illustrate the way BITs affect power dynamics between host states and foreign investors, further sidelining
the less economically powerful. It will then offer an overview
7

of the business and human rights framework in which the argument is grounded and draw two analogies between international
criminal law and broader human rights law: (1) the extension
of accountability from states to non-state actors; and (2) the
notion of complementarity between domestic and a supranational justice mechanisms. Next it will look at several cases
in which the European, African, and Inter-American regional
human rights systems have held states accountable for violations
caused by corporate non-state actors. In such cases, regional
organs already analyze the relative accountability of states and
non-state corporate actors within the limitations of ultimate
state accountability and politically permissible remedies; consequently, the article argues that they could be adapted to close
a critical accountability gap and bring more efficient justice to
victims of investment-related human rights violations. In the
final section, the article will return to Lago Agrio to illustrate
briefly how such a mechanism could work in practice.

that was re-filed in Ecuador by some of the original plaintiffs
has been ongoing since 2003. Without speculating as to its
motivations, Ecuador’s interventions throughout the long history have not assisted in bringing an efficient, effective, or fair
resolution — if that result would have been possible under any
circumstances — to the plaintiffs’ attempts at judicial recourse.
While the matter was pending in the U.S. district court, Ecuador
intervened to support Texaco’s motion to dismiss;20 it negotiated
without public consultation for remedial work and a final release
of the state’s claims against Texaco;21 and it opposed intervention by indigenous community representatives in its separate
suit against Chevron in U.S. district court.22 During the later
stage of litigation against Chevron in Ecuadorian courts,23 the
government’s interventions — even if intended to improve the
chances of judgment in the plaintiffs’ favor — seem to have furnished Chevron with the evidence it needs to initiate BIT-based
arbitration against the state on the grounds of an alleged denial
of procedural justice.24

Power Politics and Transnational Litigation
in Lago Agrio

Despite Ecuador’s manifold violations of its human rights
obligations, the introduction of the U.S.-Ecuador BIT has arguably changed the investor-state power dynamic. The BIT creates
additional due process protections for foreign investors tied to
international standards25 that are arguably difficult to meet for
states that continue to struggle with the rule of law. It also opens
the possibility of international arbitration by the foreign investor
against the state for any violation of the BIT terms.26 Negotiated
on behalf of investors by a more powerful home state, in this case
the United States, the BIT also reflects inter-state power dynamics. Finally, its standards are flexible enough to offer ample
fodder for argument to a sophisticated litigation team such as
is normally employed by a transnational corporation seeking to
avoid ultimate accountability at all costs. In so doing, the BIT
arguably limits Ecuador’s ability — where Ecuador is actually
willing — to provide adequate and effective judicial recourse to
victims of human rights violations by foreign investors.

The involvement of Texaco/Chevron13 in Ecuador over the
thirty years of investment and seventeen years of transnational
litigation illustrates the tragic and persistent accountability gap
that results from the absence of a single justice mechanism for
the triangle of actors discussed above. The Lago Agrio litigation
involves multiple as-yet unsuccessful attempts in both U.S. and
Ecuadorian forums to hold an economically powerful and legally
well-advised transnational corporation accountable for its portion of damages to indigenous communities in the Amazon.
Neither has the Ecuadorian state — which participated through
a state-owned enterprise in a consortium with Texaco and also
neglected to regulate the consortium’s activities — been meaningfully held accountable or repaired its share of damages. In
the meantime, another generation of indigenous communities in
Ecuador continues to wait for justice.

From a human rights perspective, the Ecuadorian state
owes due process protections to everyone who comes before
its judicial system, including foreign investors. Yet, there lurks
in the background a question of fundamental fairness: should
Chevron be able to benefit from lack of regulation and judicial
independence when it stands to benefit and have an end-run optout through BIT arbitration when it does not? For years, Texaco
benefited from its ability to operate in a regulatory vacuum
without needing to meet burdensome environmental standards.
Then, although it argued that Ecuador’s judicial system was
adequate,27 Texaco almost certainly sought dismissal from the
U.S. district court because it stood a greater chance of defeating
the Aguinda plaintiffs in an Ecuadorian court. When the political attitude toward international economic relations changed
after the election of President Rafael Correa28 and the government was more inclined to support plaintiffs’ attempts to hold
Chevron accountable, the lack of judicial independence and corruption looked less favorable. Yet, the BIT turned these factors
into evidence needed for a possible way out of Ecuadorian courts
and perhaps even to a damages award for Chevron. Accordingly,
Chevron filed a BIT-based arbitration claim against Ecuador in
September 2009 alleging “denial of justice” in the Lago Agrio
proceedings.29 Although this claim is as yet unsettled,30 another
arbitration tribunal awarded U.S. $700 million to Chevron in its

The impacts of oil development in the Amazon were devastating. By 1992, when Texaco stopped operating in Ecuador,
estimates were that decades of oil extraction had generated 19.3
billion gallons of toxic wastewater, most of which was disposed
in open, unlined pits; had spilled 16.8 million gallons of crude;
and had burned a daily average of about 49 million cubic feet
of natural gas without any emission controls.14 The Ecuadorian
state and Texaco share responsibility for this massive damage.
Texaco’s local subsidiary, TexPet, was the operating partner in
a consortium with the state-owned enterprise Petroecuador.15
Throughout the consortium’s operation, the state failed to
regulate the consortium’s activities, instead allowing TexPet to
self-regulate and relying on Texaco’s recognized international
expertise in oil extraction,16 all the while enjoying its share of
the profits.17
This article will not attempt to chronicle the Aguinda
litigation in U.S. federal courts, the Lago Agrio litigation in
Ecuadorian courts, or the numerous other related proceedings
between other groups of plaintiffs, various lawyers, the state,
and Texaco/Chevron.18 Suffice it to say that after nine years of
litigation in U.S. federal court, Chevron succeeded in having the
case against it — a class action filed under the Alien Tort Claims
Act — dismissed for forum non conveniens in 2001.19 The case
8

first arbitration claim against Ecuador to settle separate breach
of contract cases against Petroecuador,31 which illustrates one
way the second arbitration could be resolved.

system put in place by the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) is founded on the principle of complementarity between States Parties and the ICC as a court of last
resort. States Parties have the primary duty to investigate and
prosecute international crimes, while the ICC only steps in
where states are unwilling or unable to prosecute.40

The “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Business
Human Rights Framework and Analogy to
Complementarity in International Criminal Law
and

Similarly, enforcement of the corporation’s responsibility
to respect human rights usually falls within the state’s duty to
protect and it is the state that should guarantee victims’ effective
remedies. However, certain foreign investors that benefit from
international protections of BITs negotiated between a home
state and host state government have an unfair advantage over
the host state government. Because such advantage — along
with sheer economic power imbalances — may undermine the
host state’s ability or willingness to regulate investors or provide
effective remedies to victims, a supranational forum such as a
regional human rights system should complement state mechanisms and hold investors and host states accountable side by
side.

Under international human rights law, states have a duty to
protect those under their jurisdiction against human rights violations by non-state actors.32 Accordingly, when non-state actors
violate human rights, they are not themselves accountable under
international human rights law; rather, states are held accountable for these violations if they were complicit or failed to take
reasonable steps to prevent33 a violation the threat of which they
were aware or should have been aware.34 After a violation, states
also have a duty of due diligence to investigate, prosecute, and
punish — whether implicating state or non-state actors — or
provide a remedy or redress for the victim. Failure to fulfill these
duties leads to state accountability.35 Against this background of
firm legal duties, UN Special Representative Ruggies has coined
the “protect, respect and remedy” framework for business and
human rights: the state’s duty to protect; corporate responsibility
to protect; and victims’ need for effective remedies.36

Prepared to Take the Leap: How Regional Human
Rights Systems Analyze State Accountability for
Human Rights Violations Caused by Corporate
Non-State Actors

Such a system works quite well and makes sense when states
actually exercise control over non-state actors — which may
include individuals, organizations, rebel groups, corporations,
et al — within their territories. But, when states really do not
exercise control over certain non-state actors, human rights
systems that only impose responsibility on states for failure to
protect may actually reinforce impunity. Accordingly, international criminal law allows direct prosecution of both state and
non-state actors — although among non-state actors only natural
and not judicial persons have been held accountable to date37 —
for widespread violations that rise to the level of violating jus
cogens norms. The state in which such violations occur may also
face international human rights law responsibility if it failed to
adequately investigate, prosecute, and punish non-state actors or
was otherwise complicit in violations.38

Regional human rights systems are designed to infringe as
little as possible on state sovereignty while serving a complementary function aimed not to replace but to reinforce the
state’s domestic incorporation and enforcement of human rights
norms.41 Such exercise of restraint out of respect for the principle of complementarity is the reason that the regional human
rights systems are well positioned to take the next leap without
abusing an expanded jurisdiction. Another reason is that the
regional systems are able to balance the good and harmful
effects of corporate actor’s behavior in light of multiple overlapping rights.42 The African system, for instance, recognizes
not only a number of individual human rights, but also the collective right to social, economic, and cultural development.43
Evaluating corporate activities in such a regional system, thus,
may require explicitly weighing progress made toward realizing
a collective right to development against a specific individual’s
or community’s rights that may be violated in the development
process. Even systems that do not recognize the right to development may employ other procedures to balance at-times conflicting goals, for example by factoring them into analysis of the
state’s margin of appreciation.

Implicit in this system of accountability under international
criminal law may be the recognition that sometimes non-state
actors are stronger than and beyond the control of states, for
example during times of conflict. To tie this to a jurisdictional
principle, it could be argued that certain non-state actors are
actually acting in international space — although they may
formally be within a state’s territorial jurisdiction — if the
state is too weak to regulate those actors and fulfill its duty
to protect. This argument makes particular sense when the
non-state actors frequently cross international borders — like
the Lord’s Resistance Army wreaking havoc between Uganda,
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African
Republic, and the Sudan — perhaps even doing so deliberately
to avoid the government forces of one state or another or befuddle normal jurisdictional rules and state sovereignty.

The cases discussed below aim to illustrate these strengths
while demonstrating the analysis that all three of the regional
human rights systems have used to hold states accountable for
human rights violations caused by non-state corporate actors –
a method of analysis that could easily be modified to instead
apportion responsibility between the two. Generally, each court
or commission identifies the harm caused by the corporate
actor, often a negative environmental impact, and then assesses
the state’s performance in light of its responsibility to protect
victims against this harm, to investigate and prosecute the
corporate actors, or to otherwise provide victims with effective
remedies after the fact. This analysis is thus able to assess both
affirmative action by the state that infringes on individuals’ or

International criminal law is a useful analogy for the exception to ultimate state responsibility for human rights argued for
in this article. As just discussed, it makes the leap to individual
— and perhaps eventually corporate or other non-state entity39
— liability for violations of international law. Moreover, the
9

Such exercise of restraint out of respect for the
principle of complementarity is the reason that the
regional human rights systems are well positioned to take
the next leap without abusing an expanded jurisdiction.
Another reason is that the regional systems are able to
balance the good and harmful effects of corporate actor’s
behavior in light of multiple overlapping rights.
communities’ rights — for instance the state’s granting permission for a corporation to undertake economic activity without
required public consultation — as well as a state’s failure to
take necessary action to regulate economic activity that involves
abuses. Finally, the exploration below will allude to signs that
the regional systems themselves are already taking steps to
consider the direct liability of certain non-state corporate actors.

of the town’s economic well-being — that of having a wastetreatment plan — and the applicant’s effective enjoyment of her
right to respect for her home and her private and family life.”47

African System
The African Commission for Human and Peoples’ Rights
(ACHPR) has faced at least one case involving state responsibility for human rights violations by a large foreign investor, Royal
Dutch Shell, where state actors were also directly implicated. In
Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for
Economic and Social Rights (SERAC and CESR) v. Nigeria,48
the ACHPR found the state responsible for numerous human
rights violations associated with oil extraction by a consortium
between state-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Company
(NNPC) and Shell in the Ogoniland region.49

The European Court for Human Rights (ECtHR) has analyzed a handful of cases involving failure to properly regulate
corporate activity. However, the ECtHR tends in these cases
to consider the accountability of states with relatively strong
domestic regulation and law enforcement and involves smaller
domestic corporate non-state actors rather than larger foreign
investors. Although these cases do not typically deal with violations or impunity on the scale of those coming before the African
or Inter-American systems, discussed further below, the ECtHR
offers a useful analytical framework — including its approach to
assessing the state’s margin of appreciation44 while still finding
violations on the part of the state — in cases in which the state
would almost always be deemed willing and able to regulate the
corporate non-state actor.
In two principal cases, the ECtHR has developed a method
for finding the state responsible for harm caused by corporate
non-state actors when the state failed to take adequate steps to
protect the rights to family and private life guaranteed under
Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The
Guerra case found Italy in violation of Article 8 for failure
to provide information and warnings to residents in an area
affected by a fertilizer plant’s toxic emissions.45 The López
Ostra case held Spain accountable for a violation of Article 8
because it failed to adequately control risks posed by a company
that operated a sewage treatment plant, for instance by closing
the plant or assisting affected parties to relocate in a timely
manner.46 The ECtHR also indicated the limits of the margin of
appreciation afforded to the state in balancing a community’s
economic interests with individual rights, concluding that Spain
“did not succeed in striking a fair balance between the interest

Courtesy of IndyMedia Ireland.

European Court of Human Rights

Ogoni community members protest against Shell's involvement in
Nigeria.

The complaint alleged that the Nigerian government had violated several rights enshrined in the African Charter on Human
and Peoples Rights: the rights to health (Article 16) and to a
clean environment (Article 24) of the Ogoni people. The state
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both (1) directly participated through the NNPC, a majority
shareholder in the consortium, in contamination of air, water,
and land causing adverse health consequences to the Ogoni; and
(2) failed to protect the Ogoni population from this type of harm
caused by the consortium.50 Exercising restraint similar to the
ECtHR’s margin of appreciation analysis, the Commission considered that the government of Nigeria has the right to produce
oil to improve the realization of economic and social rights for
its people, but not without due care not to violate other rights
in the process.51 Additionally, the Commission found the state
responsible for a violation of the Ogoni people’s collective
right to “freely dispose of their wealth and natural resources”
pursuant to Article 21 due to the government’s failure to include
the Ogoni in its consultations with the consortium.52 Finally,
because of the Nigerian military’s further involvement in violence and destruction of property committed against the Ogoni
in retaliation against their protests of the consortium’s activities, the Commission found the state in violation of additional
explicit and implicit rights – including the right to life as well as
the rights to property, housing, and food – protected under the
Banjul Charter.53

liability of non-state actors for human and peoples’ rights violations under its protective mandate.”59

Inter-American System
The Inter-American system has addressed numerous situations akin to that faced by the Ogoni in Nigeria or the Lago
Agrio plaintiffs in Ecuador, involving human rights violations
on a community-wide scale resulting from joint public-private
ventures or concessions granted to private corporations without
any or adequate consultation with affected indigenous communities. Since the Awas Tingni case decided by the Inter-American
Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) in 2001,60 the system has
developed a method for preventing potential violations by nonstate corporate actors before they occur by allowing indigenous
communities to challenge government concessions of land or
natural resources.61
Within the cases emerging from the Inter-American system,
there is a subset that commence after substantive human rights
violations have resulted from the activities of corporate non-state
actors — in short, cases in which a violation of procedural protections may be part of the complaint but come too late to serve a
completely preventive function. These cases illustrate how the InterAmerican system often ties state responsibility for harm already
caused by non-state actors to the requirement of an “adequate and
effective remedy” through judicial recourse for violations of substantive rights caused entirely or in part by non-state actors.

In conclusion, the Commission remarked on the balance that
the state must strike between competing priorities of economic
development and protection of rights:
The Commission does not wish to fault governments
that are laboring under difficult circumstances to
improve the lives of their people. . . . The intervention
of multinational corporations may be a potentially positive force for development if the State and the people
concerned are ever mindful of the common good and
the sacred rights of individuals and communities.54

Two IACHR cases in particular, Toledo Maya v. Belize and
Community of San Mateo De Huanchora and Its Members v.
Peru, demonstrate the method already employed by the InterAmerican system. In Toledo Maya, the indigenous community
challenged Belize’s grant of logging and oil concessions on
large portions of their ancestral land, among other failures
by the state to protect and recognize the indigenous land and
resource rights. The petition was filed in 1998, five years after
the state first granted the concessions.62 Although by the time
the Commission heard the case, the state claimed that all logging and oil exploration had ceased, the community presented
evidence that two large Malaysian timber companies had undertaken significant logging during the interim period.63 This logging activity, including clear-cutting, fell within the permitted
scope of the concessions and was thus legal from the perspective
of the foreign investors.64 Yet, since the state violated the indigenous community’s property rights when granting to concessions, the Commission recommended that the state repair the
environmental damage caused by logging.65

The Commission’s final recommendations were for the
new government to take further steps to ensure “compensation
for victims of the human rights violations,” “a comprehensive
cleanup of lands and rivers damaged by oil operations,” and
“the safe operation of any further oil development . . . guaranteed through effective and independent oversight bodies for the
petroleum industry.”55
In the decade since this 2001 ACHPR decision, Nigeria
has allowed victims to seek remedies through domestic courts,
which have twice awarded large monetary damages to victim
communities.56 Shell has used its significant resources to appeal
each judgment. Moreover, only Shell has argued these damages
should be apportioned between the foreign investor and stateowned enterprise. Meanwhile, Nigeria has not proven itself
willing or able to effectively regulate oil companies in the Delta
or clean up prior environmental degradation.57

The San Mateo De Huanchora case66 is distinguishable from
Toledo Maya because it involves domestic corporate non-state
actors — not foreign investors — who blatantly violated national
law; thus it was a case of state failure to regulate and enforce
its own law. In San Mateo, a coalition of affected communities
brought a complaint against Peru for its failure to address severe
pollution from a field of toxic sludge produced by a mining
company, Lizandro Proaño S.A.67 The IACHR granted the petitioners’ request for precautionary measures and asked Peru to
immediately conduct a new environmental assessment to determine how the sludge should be removed and begin work to transfer and contain the sludge.68 The Commission also rejected the

In the face of continued and widespread human rights
violations associated with foreign investment in Nigeria and
elsewhere on the continent,58 the ACHPR is seeking ways to
more directly address such violations caused by non-state corporate actors, particularly those in the extractive industries. In
November 2009, the Commission constituted a Working Group
on Extractive Industries, Environment, and Human Rights
Violations in Africa with a two-year research mandate that
includes “inform[ing] the African Commission on the possible
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state’s claim that the petitioners had failed to exhaust domestic
remedies, which the government argued for based on its claims
that criminal charges were pending against the company’s mining director and an administrative proceeding was underway to
shut down the mining company and remove the sludge.69 The
Commission found that these measures did not constitute an
“adequate and effective” remedy for the present harm resulting
from the pollution, and moreover noted that the administrative
proceedings had been pending for three years while the pollution
continued.70

state responsibility for human rights violations associated with
oil extraction,75 and concluded its report with strong words:
Decontamination is needed to correct mistakes that
ought never to have happened. Both the State and the
companies conducting oil exploitation activities are
responsible for such anomalies, and both should be
responsible for correcting them. It is the duty of the
State to ensure that they are corrected.76

Of all the cases surveyed above, perhaps only a case such
as that of Shell in Nigeria — notable for its striking similarities
to the Lago Agrio case — is one in which the narrow exception
argued for in this article would apply. The other cases serve as
a few examples of the methods employed by regional systems
to ensure that under normal circumstances the state is responsibility for protection of human rights and provision of effective
remedies to victims. Moreover, these cases demonstrate the
analysis employed by regional systems when facing violations
that are the joint product of corporate failure to respect and state
failure to protect or respect human rights. In a majority of these
cases, ultimate and sole state accountability before the regional
human rights systems seems appropriate. Yet, in instances of an
economically powerful and legally well-advised transnational
corporation that benefits from the protections of bilateral investment treaties, this system of accountability is less tenable. Shell,
like Chevron in Ecuador, continues to use tremendous legal
resources to avoid Nigerian attempts to hold it accountable for
its share of damages, while pointing out that it should not be
held solely accountable where it worked in consortium with a
state-owned enterprise. In such circumstances, a supranational
forum ultimately concerned with human rights and the availability of effective remedies is the appropriate forum for assessing and apportioning damages between the state and the foreign
investor.

By Kate Fisher.

The Leap Forward

Huoarani children near Lago Agrio, Ecuador.

While its actual recommendations were somewhat less
forceful, they did include calling for Ecuador to undertake “preventive and remedial action” and reminding the state that it is
obliged to ensure “that all individuals of the Oriente have access
to effective judicial recourse to lodge claims concerning the
rights under the Constitution and the American Convention.”77
In the ensuing thirteen years, Ecuador has progressed little
in complying with these recommendations, a fact which may be
faulted to both the government and the power dynamics identified at the outset of this article. At the time of the Commission’s
visit, Texaco was undertaking remedial work pursuant to its
MoU with Petroecuador and the Ecuadorian state,78 and the
Commission was able to document the affected community’s
mixed responses to the work.79 No matter the criticisms of how
Texaco executed its remedial work, the MoU divided the remedial work to be done and the part delegated to Petroecuador has
yet to be completed. Some affected communities, and perhaps
even the government, seem to be waiting for a judgment against
Chevron to pay for a major remediation project.80 Other affected
communities like the Kichwa and Huaorani are “beginning to
develop and implement remedial projects themselves, rather
than simply denouncing, exhorting, petitioning — and waiting
for others to act.”81

A More Efficient Path to Justice?
Returning to Lago Agrio in Ecuador, this final section aims
to sketch out how a regional human rights system such as the
Inter-American could be adapted to provide a more efficient
path to justice for victims who otherwise bear far too great a
share of the costs of delayed justice. Years before the Aguinda
suit was ever filed in the United States, the Huaorani people,
one of the indigenous groups in Ecuador most impacted by
the Texaco/Petroecuador consortium’s oil extraction in the
Amazon, petitioned the IACHR alleging that other prospective oil development activities threatened numerous rights.71 In
September 1991 and October 1993, the IACHR held hearings
on the petition.72 Yet, the Commission realized that the “general
claims lodged concerning the Huoarani [were] not unique.”73
Accordingly, it organized a country visit to Ecuador, including
Lago Agrio and its surroundings, and in 1997 issued a report
on the human rights situation with chapters on human rights in
Ecuador’s interior affected by oil development and on human
rights issues of special relevance to indigenous communities.74
The Commission found ample evidence to support a theory of

As for judicial recourse, Ecuador passed a new law in 1998
creating a cause of action for individuals to sue for environmental damage; this law was one of the legal bases for the suit
filed by the Lago Agrio plaintiffs. But, the Ecuadorian judiciary
did not permit a separate complaint by a broader coalition of
indigenous plaintiffs to proceed in seeking recourse against
Chevron.82 Moreover, whether it speaks to perceived or real lack
of judicial independence, the Lago Agrio plaintiffs did not bring
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a suit against the state-owned Petroecuador;83 nor has Chevron
impleaded Petroecuador in the suit against it in Ecuador. Finally,
until the Lago Agrio suit is actually resolved — and unless it
results in complete environmental remediation that eliminates
the continuing dangers to the health and lives of people in the
affected communities84 — that form of judicial recourse cannot
be deemed effective.

by both respondents, the Court had been able to grant an appropriate remedy that apportioned damages according to relative
fault between the foreign investor and Ecuador, resolving in a
single supranational proceeding all related claims between the
three parties.
In embarking on this flight of imagination, this article does
not deny the substantial procedural and jurisdictional changes
that would be required for the regional human rights systems to
make such adaptation — nor does it underestimate the political
barriers any attempts at such adaptation would surely encounter.
The Organization of American States and the African Union
might have to revisit the constitutive documents for each of
the regional organs; the regional organs would have to modify
their rules of procedure and develop jurisprudence to govern
the exceptional joinder of foreign investors to proceedings; and
there might have to be some consent to the jurisdiction of such
organs by foreign investors.85

But imagine if the Huoarani community’s 1990 petition had
been based on past rather than prospective harm caused by oil
extraction and had alleged direct violations by the state and violations of its duty to protect. Imagine that the Commission had
permitted such a complaint to proceed, finding that domestic
remedies would be ineffective under the circumstances because
the judiciary would be unable to hear a complaint against a
state-owned entity or against a foreign investor that had been
part of a consortium with a state-owned entity. Imagine that the
Commission had proceeded with its state visit and issued its
recommendations to Ecuador as part of an Article 50 report in
response to the Huoarani community petition. After the required
time passed and Ecuador did not seem to be complying with
recommendations, imagine that the Commission had referred
the petition to the Inter-American Court. Then, imagine that
at some point in the preparations for hearings, the Court took
judicial notice of developments in the litigation against Chevron
in Ecuador and determined that the state was unable or unwilling to provide effective remedy against Chevron in its judicial
system on account of its BIT obligations to a foreign investor.
Then, upon this finding, imagine that the Court had been able
to join the foreign investor and the respondents in a single case
responding to the petitioners’ claims. Finally, imagine that after
evaluating the harm to the petitioners and the defenses presented

This article will not go further in sketching out these
logistics as each step would require many parties negotiating
and exploring the boundaries and overlaps between the as-yet
un-harmonized bodies of international human rights and international investment law. It would also involve confronting the
very triangulation and power imbalances that have resulted in
the accountability gap for both host states and foreign investors
to the detriment of victims. Suffice it to say that adaptation of
regional human rights systems to fill an identified accountability
gap is possible and is perhaps the path least fraught with difficulties that could provide victims with a more effective and
more efficient justice than what they have found thus far in Lago
Agrio.			
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